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Abstract
Improving access to capital through credit and public spendings is an important step
toward development and poverty alleviaton. At the same tme, deforestaton-related
actvites, like agricultural expansion, can be seen as relying on natural capital, through the
depleton of forest resources and the use of land in an extensive way. It is then important to
beter understand how a beter access to capital infuence the use of land as a natural
capital. This paper assesses the relatonship between fnancial development, public
spendings and deforestaton. Are they substtute or complement? Our econometric analysis
shows that deforestaton is positvely correlated to access to credit and public spendings,
which gives some evidence that natural capital is a complement to credit and public
spendings. 
Mots clés / Key Words: deforestaton, development, credit, public spendings.
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1 Introduction
While deforestation is a crucial environmental concern worldwide, it also represents a source
of income for many agents and communities, since it results in agricultural expansion and timber
harvest (Celentano et al. (2012)). In this sense, deforestation can be considered as the use of
natural capital (land and forest resources) on the development path by agents lacking of other
capital opportunities (Azqueta and Sotelsek (2007)). Indeed, in developing countries natural capital
represents a larger part of their wealth than in developed ones (Ruta and Hamilton 2007; World
Bank (The) 2006).
Using natural capital for development purposes may be related to the issue of complementarity
or substitutability between deforestation and man-made capital that has been investigated and
debated in the literature (see among others, Barbier (2003)). Optimal growth models have been
extended by some authors (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974) where the
conditions of technical progress and substitution between natural capital and material capital are
analyzed. Their approach implicitly suggests that substitution between natural and material capi-
tal can create the conditions of unbounded economic development, even in a world with exhaustible
resources i.e. finite natural capital. This view has been challenged by proponents of strong sustain-
ability who after Daly and Georgescu-Roegen argue in favor of maintaining each type of capital
(Daly and Townsend 1993; Daly 1997). For instance, Jouvet and DePerthuis (2012) argue that
natural capital depletion can affect the marginal productivity of the whole economy. The Meadows
Reports or more recently Diamond gave examples of unsustainable and collapsing societies which
have relied too heavily on natural capital depletion (Meadows et al. 1972; Meadows et al. 2005;
Diamond 2013).
In this paper, we intend to go further the weak versus strong sustainability debate by considering
how man-made capital that encompasses credit and public spending has an effect on deforestation.
Improving access to credit may be seen as a key issue to help rural communities to develop, as
credit constraints are an important barrier to development (Anjini (1997)) and the development
of credit markets an important factor of growth (Hung and Cothren (2002)). Several papers have
been considering empirically the impact of the development of credit banking on the efficiency
of investments (Odedokun (1996)). Ge and Qiu (2007) suggest that informal capital can be a
substitute to formal capital when credit markets are poorly developed. Following Rudel and Roper
(1997), Geist and Lambin (2001) argue that deforestation may be capital driven. Some studies in
Latin America do find evidence that access to credit favors more deforestation-related activities
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than the others (Barbier and Burgess, 1996; Pfaff, 1997). In contrast, Godoy et al. (1997) consider
in their studies on Bolivia and Honduras that families with a better access to credit are less
forest-dependent than others. Finally, Monela (1995) finds a positive relationship between credit
availability and forest clearing in Tanzania.
Government expenditures have also often been thought to foster deforestation (e.g. Angelsen
and Kaimowitz 1999; Geist and Lambin 2001). Several authors have evidenced the role of transport
infrastructures (e.g. Pfaff, 1999). In a similar vein, Bulte et al. (2007) show that rural subsidies
towards large farmers triggered deforestation in Latin America. At last, Galinato and Galinato
(2013) evidence a positive impact of government spending on deforestation. Interestingly they
do not confirm the effect of a composition effect: the provision of public goods has no effect on
deforestation. Perhaps, one possible explanation of the results is whether there is an omitted
variable.
A crucial question is whether public spending and access to credit jointly affect deforestation
process. In this paper, we try to fill a gap in the literature by exploring the simultaneous effect
of credit and public spending, which both contribute to man-made capital, on deforestation. Does
this capital substitute or complement to natural capital?
We argue that assessing the impact of public spending (access to credit) on deforestation cannot
be made without considering access to credit (public spending). Indeed, the link between credit
and public spending is well established in the macro-economic literature. On the one hand, there
could exist a crowding in effect à la Barro (Barro 1990). Under that hypothesis, private production
depends on both credit and productive government expenditures which considered as an input
to private production. Marginal productivity of private capital is therefore positively affected by
public spending. On the other hand, a crowding out effect can be put forward according to which
an increase in public spending dries out the credit available to private agents. The rest of this
paper is organized as follows. We define first the kinds of mechanism that relate deforestation to
credit and public spending. Then we assess the nature of this relationship, using panel-data analysis
relating credit development and public spending to deforestation. Section 2 presents a simple model
of substitutability and complementarity between deforestation and man-made capital. Section 3
presents our econometric analysis, and section 4 concludes.
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2 A simple model of capital input and net income maximization
In this section, we investigate the channels by which a better access to private capital or public
spendings may be related to deforestation. Consider a representative agent, that maximizes its net
income:
max
D,K,δ
I(D,K, δ) = A(D, δK) +O((1− δ)K)− c(D)− c(K) (1)
Net income is derived from the agents’ economic activities, that depend on its access to two
types of assets: natural capital, through deforestation D, and made-man capital (henceforth called
capital) K. By this term, we mean here capital requiring both credit and public expenses that
benefit to agents 1. Income A(D, δK) comes from activities related to deforestation (agricultural
expansion, timber harvesting, fuelwood collection...), while income O((1 − δ)K) comes from ac-
tivities not related to deforestation (subsidies to direct consumption, agricultural intensification,
trade and business, work to the city...). δ is the share of capital allocated to deforestation-related
activities. We assume here standard properties2: Ai ≥ 0, Aii ≤ 0, ∀i = D,K; OK ≥ 0, OKK ≤ 0.
The costs function that are defined in equation 1 are increasing and convex: : ci ≥ 0, cii ≥ 0,
∀i = D,K. The cost of access to natural capital is related to property rights, as well as to the
availability of the resource: Are forests open access? Are property rights safe and well defined?
Are forests a scarce resource? The cost of credit is related to the level of financial development,
credit supply and public expenses in the country: Is credit easily accessible to rural communities?
Is credit supply abundant? Which citizens are targeted by redistributive policies?
First-order conditions implicitly give the level of deforestation D∗, capital K∗ and share of
capital allocated to deforestation-related activities δ∗:
X = AD − cD = 0 (2)
Y = δAK + (1− δ)OK − cK = 0 (3)
Z = KAK −KOK = 0 (4)
Equation 2 indicates that deforestation D∗ increases with its marginal productivity and de-
creases with its marginal cost. Equation 3 shows that capital K∗ is chosen in order to equal
marginal productivity and marginal cost of capital. Equation 4 defines the allocation of capital
δ∗ as the equalization of the marginal productivity of capital between deforestation-related and
deforestation-unrelated activities.
1Those two kinds of capital will be distinguished in the empirical section.
2The subscripts refer to first and second derivatives.
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In this context, if there is some development of the financial system, an increase in credit supply
or an increase in public expenses that result in a decrease of the marginal cost of capital, it is likely
to have an indirect impact on deforestation. First, looking at equation 3 and applying the implicit
function theorem, the decrease in marginal cost of capital tends to increase the access to capital
for the agent:
K∗cK = −
YcK
YK∗
=
1
δ∗AKK + (1− δ∗)OKK − cKK
< 0 (5)
Second, from equation 4, this increased access to capital changes its allocation between
deforestation-related and deforestation-unrelated activities:
δ∗K∗ = −
ZK∗
Zδ∗
= −
δ∗AKK − (1− δ
∗)OKK
KAKK +KOKK
(6)
The denominator being unambiguously negative, the sign of equation 6 is the one of the nom-
inator. Therefore, we can see that the share of capital allocated to deforestation-related activities
increases if the marginal productivity of those activities decreases more slowly than the one of
deforestation-unrelated activities. In other words, the agents allocate a larger part of capital to
deforestation-related activities if the related additional amount of capital is more productive in
those activities than in deforestation-unrelated activities.
Third, using equation 2, it is possible to see what could be the end-of-pipe effect of an increase
in access to capital on deforestation:
D∗(δ∗K∗) = −
X(δ∗K∗)
XD∗
= −
δ∗ADK − cDK
ADD − cDD
(7)
Here again, the denominator is unambiguously negative. Therefore, an increase in capital
allocated to deforestation-related activities tends to increase deforestation if the net marginal pro-
ductivity of deforestation is increasing in capital allocated.
Overall, this two-steps relationship defines the impact of an increased access to capital on
deforestation. Deforestation may be positively related to better access to capital if :
• an increased access to capital increases the profitability of deforestation-related activities
more than the one of deforestation-unrelated activities and capital and deforestation are
complement: δ∗AKK − (1− δ
∗)OKK > 0, δ
∗ADK − cDK > 0;
• an increased access to capital increases the profitability of deforestation-unrelated activities
more than the one of deforestation-related ones and capital and deforestation are substitute:
δ∗AKK − (1− δ
∗)OKK < 0, δ
∗ADK − cDK < 0. Although this case is theoretically possible,
it is quite unlikely in real life, as an increased in access to capital is likely to increase the
marginal profitability of deforestation, mainly through machinery.
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Since the first case is more likely than the second one, we consider that observing a positive
relationship between deforestation and access to capital describes a situation of complementar-
ity between natural capital and made-man capital, while a situation of substitutability will be
considered in the case of a negative relationship.
Within this very simple model, the term "capital" encompasses both credit and public expenses.
However, those two types of asset may have diverse relationships with deforestation. Moreover, as
better access to credit and better management of public spendings is a crucial interest in the
implementation of development policies, it is important to investigate those relationships, whether
deforestation tends to be positively or negatively related to access to those two other forms of
capital.
3 The empirical analysis of deforestation, credit, and public
spendings
Data and econometric specifications are described first, then the results are presented and
discussed. Regressions are run on a sample of forested developing countries in Asia, Latin America
as well as Sub-Saharan Africa excepted small islands of which forested areas are negligible.3
3.1 Data set
The rate of deforestation from FAOstat databases is the dependent variable, measured over the
1990 2010 period. Other variables are either from the World Bank Indicators or the PRS group for
variables measuring institutional quality.4 All variables in the model are computed over five years
periods (1990-1194,1995-1999,2000-2004,2005-2010) to catch delays in the deforestation adjustment
processes.
The two interest variables which approach the theoretical notion of man-made capital derived
from our model are domestic credit provided by the banking sector over GDP (Credit) and gov-
ernment consumption over GDP (GovCons).
Three groups of control variables are considered, following the usual literature on deforestation
(Angelsen and Kaimowitz (1999) and Barbier (2001), among others).
Deforestation is influenced by structural factors. Rates of deforestation may be characterized by
inertia thus inducing the effect of lagged on current deforestation rates (Lagged Defor). According
3The list of countries included in regression analysis is given in the appendix
4Variables are described in the appendix.
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to the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) assumption, GDP per capita and squared GDP per
capita in logs (Lgdppc and Lgdppcsq) should respectively influence deforestation positively and
negatively. Nevertheless, as shown in Choumert et al. (2013) existing studies provide ambiguous
results: Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) or Culas (2007) find an EKC contrary to Meyer, Van
Kooten and Wang (2003). Concerning population in logs (Lpop), the expected impact is also
ambiguous. Indeed, if population fuels the demand for arable lands, fuelwood or charcoal (Cropper
and Griffiths 1994), it could also promote the demand for forest products (Foster and Rosenzweig
2003) and thereby having a negative impact on deforestation rates. Whether urbanization (Urbpop)
drives deforestation is also an empirical question. On the one hand, pressure on forestland would
decline with the rural-urban migration but on the other hand, urbanization could raise the level
the demand for agricultural products.5
The macroeconomic environment matters in the deforestation process. We assume that the real
exchange rate (Reer) and its instability (ReerInst) could lead to deforestation. The first variable
catches the competitiveness of the export sector: an increase in the real exchange rate means a real
appreciation. Real appreciation is expected to dampen deforestation since exported forest products
are negatively affected (Arcand et al. 2008). The second variable is a proxy for the macroeconomic
instability which can boost deforestation. Indeed risk adverse agents could mitigate the influence of
macroeconomic instability relying more on the depletion of natural resources, including forests. We
also assume that the higher the debt service (DebtBurden), the higher the deforestation. Indeed,
Kahn and McDonald (1995) outline a significant positive association between public debt and
deforestation in LDCs.
Institutions could also affect the deforestation process. Following Bhattarai and Hammig (2001)
and Ferreira (2004), better institutions preserve forests. In this paper, we approach the institutional
quality with an index extracted from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. More
precisely, we consider two aspects of institutional quality: political stability and public integrity as
put forward by (Ferreira and Vincent 2010) with three measures that are alternatively introduced:
government stability (Gov Stab),6 internal conflicts (Int Conf) and corruption (Cor), of which an
increase means an improvement. We therefore assume that these variables have a negative impact
on deforestation.
5DeFries et al. (2010) stress the positive influence of urbanization on deforestation with recent data which contrast
with results obtained in previous studies for the 1980s and the 1990s.
6The variable is introduced in logs. In order to deal with zero values, we add 1 to the variable before computing
logs.
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3.2 Econometric specification
The estimations are made using country-specific and period-specific fixed-effects to control re-
spectively omitted variables constant over time (e.g. country characteristics) and omitted variables
common to the countries (e.g. international prices). The Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimator for
dynamic panel is implemented for two reasons (Arellano and Bond 1991). Firstly, the OLS estima-
tor is inconsistent since the lagged dependent variable is introduced besides country fixed-effects
(Nickell 1981). Secondly the GMM estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of the two
interest variables due to measurement error, reverse causality or omission of relevant variables.The
equations are estimated in first differences and the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are
used as instruments.7 The validity of the instruments is tested by the Sargan/Hansen overidenti-
fication test and by the serial correlation test AR(2), where the null hypothesis is that the error
term does not exhibit second order auto-correlation.
3.3 Results
The results related to our control variable (table 1) are consistent with the literature: (1) The
dynamic panel estimator is not rejected by the aforementioned tests. The coefficient of the lagged
dependent variable is significantly positive which involves an AR(1) process of deforestation; (2) The
Environmental Kuznets Curve is not validated by our data; (3) Population and urban population
(equations 5 to 10) respectively affect positively and negatively the rate of deforestation; (4) The
macroeconomic environment variables have the expected signs. Debt service as measured by Debt
Burden has a positive impact on deforestation (equations 6 to 9). A real appreciation protects
the forest while its instability is detrimental to it (equation 10). (5) Institutional quality variables
(equations 7 to 10) have the expected negative signs.
As regards our interest variables, Credit and Gov Cons have weakly significant impacts on
deforestation when introduced separately (equations 1 and 2). This result is interpreted as a
symptom of omitted variable bias: other things held equal, Gov Cons seems to crowd out Credit.
Interestingly, marginal effects are lower than those reported in equation 3 when Credit and Gov
Cons are introduced simultaneously. Equation 3 therefore illustrates a complementarity effect
between man-made capital and natural capital. These positive signs are robust to the introduction
7The lagged deforestation rate and the interest variables are instrumented by their lagged values. The controls
variables are considered as exogenous.To deal with the problem of instruments proliferation, the matrix of instruments
is collapsed to ensure that the number of instruments does not exceed the number of countries (Roodman 2009).
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of the controls (equations 5 to 10). When interacted (equation 4), Gov Cons x Credit have a
positive though weakly significant effect on deforestation which may interpreted as a crowding in
impact of Gov Cons (resp. Credit) on Credit (resp. Gov Cons) à la Barro. Moreover, according
to equation 3, the impact of an increase in our interest variables on deforestation rates can be
simulated. A one standard deviation increase in Gov Cons (Credit) leads to an increase in the
deforestation rate, which represents 21% (28%) of its average value. This is a rather important
impact which highlights the intensity in the complementarity effect between man-made capital and
natural capital.
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Table 1: Empirical Results
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lagged Defor 0.0614 0.0437 0.0630 0.0697 0.0758 0.0665 0.0869 0.0713 0.0645 0.0640
(2.5695)** (1.8398)* (3.5838)*** (7.6934)*** (4.4244)*** (3.6970)*** (5.7899)*** (4.1028)*** (2.8216)*** (3.8277)***
Lgdppc -0.0015 0.0013 0.0014 0.0030 0.0008 0.0006 0.0012 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0011
(-0.5220) (0.4054) (0.6832) (2.1805)** (0.3938) (0.2516) (0.5432) (0.2658) (0.1073) (-0.4628)
Lgdppc sq 3.92E-0.5 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 - 0.0002 -7.58E-05 -9.78E-05 -6.58E-05 -3.05E-05 4.94E-05
(0.1898) (-0.6181) (-1.2975) (-2.7286)*** (-1.0552) (-0.3983) (-0.5479) (-0..3403) (-0.1507) (0.2937)
L Pop 0.0050 0.0044 0.0025 0.0024 0.0037 0.0012 0.0016 0.0020 0.0008 0.0038
(2.2303)** (1.8569)** (1.5279) (1.9036)* (1.9462)* (0.7957) (0.9664) (1.1809) (0.5357) (1.9976)**
Urb Pop -6.55E-05 -5.94E-05 -7.89E-05 -6.30E-05 -7.11E-05 -0.0001
(-1.3352) (-1.2585) (-1.9693)* (-1.3401) (-1.6085)* (-2.7497)***
GovCons 4.87E-05 8.70E-05 9.43E-05 8.70 E-05 6.71E-05 6.24 E-05 5.65E-05 7.87E-05 3.88E-05
(1.6150) (3.5642)*** (4.2523)*** (3.4939)*** (2.2840)** (2.0197)** (1.8413)* (2.4337)** (1.9472)*
Credit 8.91E-06 1.38E-05 -2.90E-06 1.70E-05 1.65E-05 1.71 E-05 1.72E-05 1.43E-05 6.90E-06
(1.2175) (3.9166)*** (-0.6344) (4.4122)*** (3.7301)*** (3.7009)*** (3.3848)*** (3.0944)*** (2.1663)**
GovCons x Credit 4.35E-07
(1.6790)*
Debt Burden 3.87E-05 2.72E-05 3.67E-05 3.58E-05
(2.0682)** (2.1016)** (1.8743)* (2.7503)***
Gov Stab -0.0016
(-2.3565)**
Int Conf -0.0001
(-2.2379)**
Cor -0.0003 -0.0002
(-2.0472)** (-2.6252)***
Reer -3.29E-06
(-1.6605)*
Reer Inst 9.81E-06
(3.4689)***
Obs 230 230 230 230 230 216 216 216 216 223
Periods included 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Countries included 61 61 61 61 61 57 57 57 57 59
Number of instruments 27 27 39 59 40 41 42 42 42 51
OID test p value 0.70 0.69 0.52 0.47 0.51 0.74 0.67 0.75 0.79 0.81
AR(2) p value 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.23
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4 Concluding Remarks
Building capital is an important goal of economic development. Financial development provides
means to achieve this objective. Increasing public spending may also be eligible for the provision of
capital in developing countries. At the same time, deforestation and land-use change can be consid-
ered as the use of natural capital to achieve development. It follows that assessing the relationship
between those different forms of capital is important, in a world in which poverty alleviation through
access to credit and deforestation are both important development and environment issues.
This paper draws attention on conflicting environmental and development objectives: capital
as a mean of development may be built at the expenses of natural assets like tropical forests.
Indeed we find evidence that an increased access to credit and public spendings seem to boost more
deforestation-related activities than others. In this sense, man-made capital and natural capital
may be considered as complement more than substitute in this context.
An important research recommendation here is then to deepen the analysis of this comple-
mentarity and to find potential sources of substitutability. Indeed it is important to understand
in which context a better access to credit - an crucial development requisite- is not achieved at
the expense of forests depletion. Disentangling the access to man-made capital as a way to boost
depletion of natural capital is then essential.
In terms of policy recommendation, our results can be interpreted as evidencing the existence
of a Tinbergen rule which states that several objectives can be fulfilled only with a sufficient
number of instruments: reducing the threat on forests is not likely to indirectly come from better
access to credit and local development, unless further effort are made to orientate the investment
in deforestation-unrelated activities. Environmental instruments need to be added to traditional
economic instruments in the achievement for instance of the Millennium Development Goals.
Those suggestions have to be considered in the light of development policies. According to
Humphreys (2006), the World Bank has long considered forests as an abundant and under-harvested
asset, and focused on the need of developing countries to build access to capital in order to develop
forest-related activities. In contrast, since the 1990, the World Bank seemed to took into consider-
ation this complementarity between natural assets and human-made assets. In this sense, the WB
strategy around forests has been to focus on the development of markets for goods and services
(NTFP, carbon sequestration, eco-tourism), that could be described in our model as deforestation-
unrelated activities. At the same time, the focus has been put in order to decreases the expected
profitability of deforestation-related activities (timber certification for instance). A next step of
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development agencies would be to explicitly take into account the channels of diffusion of a better
access to credit and capital, by giving the right incentives that would lead to deforestation-unrelated
activities.
Appendix
Table 2: Countries list
Sub-Saharan Africa (29) Asia (12) Latin America (20)
Angola Bangladesh Argentina
Burkina Faso Brunei Bolivia
Botswana China Brazil
Cote d’Ivoire Indonesia Chile
Cameroon India Colombia
Congo, Republic of Korea, Republic of Costa Rica
Ethiopia Malaysia Ecuador
Gabon Mongolia Guatemala
Ghana Pakistan Guyana
Guinea Philippines Honduras
Gambia, The Papua New Guinea Mexico
Guinea-Bissau Vietnam Nicaragua
Kenya Panama
Liberia Peru
Madagascar Paraguay
Mali El Salvador
Mozambique Suriname
Malawi Thailand
Namibia Uruguay
Niger Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Tanzania
Uganda
South Africa
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Table 3: Variables
Variables Description Source Average (Standard deviation) Median
Dependent
variable:
Defor Average annual deforestation rate FAOstat. Four periods: 1991-95; 1996-00; 2001-05; 2006-
10. FAO production yearbook provided instruments for
lagged values of deforestation rates
0.0021 (0.0039) 0.0018
Explanatory
variables:
All variables are period averages Four periods: 1991-95; 1996-00; 2001-05; 2006-10.
Interest variables
Credit Domestic Credit provided by the Banking Sector, % of
GDP. 
World Bank Data: http://data.worldbank.org 42.7307 (40.0493) 30.5907
Gov cons General government final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP)
idem 13.3456 (5.1048) 12.1443
Control variables
GDPPC GDP per capita, constant 2000 USD. idem 2395.261 (3436.476) 1024.6370
Pop Population, total. 69.07E+06 (2.12E+08) 13.17E+06
UrbPop Urban population, % of total. idem 47.1430 (21.5917) 44.9071
DebtBurden Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and
income). 
idem 5.4792 (5.1698) 4.3196
Reer Real effective exchange rate, base 100 in 1990. Weights
determined by the country’s first ten partners (imports and
exports), oil countries excluded or not. An increase means
a real appreciation. 
Authors’ calculations, World Bank Data 111.9092 (35.5919) 102.8959
Reer Inst Instability of the Real effective exchange rate. It is
calculated as the squared residuals of the country-
individual regressions of Reer on one-year lagged Reer and
a deterministic trend
Authors’ calculations 4.8109 (14.4654) 2.7615
Corruption Corruption index from the International Country Risk
Guide database. Ranks from 0 to 6. An increase means an
improvement i.e. a decrease in corruption. 
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx 2.5161 (0.8849) 2.4792
Int Conf Internal conflicts index from the International Country
Risk Guide database. It assesses political violence in the
country and its actual or potential impact on governance.
Ranks from 0 to 12. An increase means an improvement
i.e. a decrease in the intensity of political violence.
idem 8.6084 (1.6650) 8.8333
Gov Stab Government stability index from the International Country
database. It both assesses the government’s ability to carry
out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office.
Ranks from 0 to 12. An increase means an improvement
idem 8.0008 (1.7687) 8.4458
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